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THE NATIONAL IMPERATIVE FOR HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION: WHY CERTAIN 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ARE 
APPROPRIATE DESPITE SECTION 7 OF THE 
CLAYTON ACT 
NATHAN D. SARGENT 
ABSTRACT 
Integration among health care providers offers a promising solution to the health 
care crisis. Unfortunately, some efforts to improve the American health care system 
through integration have been halted by antitrust concerns and the enforcement of 
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Health care costs could be contained and clinical 
quality improved by allowing a narrow statutory exemption to enforcement of 
section 7 for health care integrations that demonstrate cost efficiency and advance 
patient care. Under such limited circumstances, relaxed antitrust regulation is an 
appropriate response to health care’s current financial crisis that will ultimately 
benefit America’s consumers and economy by transforming the fragmented volume-
based health care system to one based on value.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The American health care system is rapidly transforming.1 Disruptive forces, 
such as the evolution of the physician-patient relationship,2 payment reform,3 and the 
continued implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“Affordable Care Act”),4 have only increased the level of complexity in an already 
multifarious industry. Coupled with long-term financial challenges,5 health care’s 
                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Ellen Lee, 5 Ways Technology is Transforming Health Care, FORBES (Jan. 24, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bmoharrisbank/2013/01/24/5-ways-technology-is-
transforming-health-care (showing five key technological advancements in health care); Susan 
DeVore, The Changing Health Care World: Trends to Watch in 2014, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG 
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/10/the-changing-health-care-world-
trends-to-watch-in-2014/ (noting key trends to monitor throughout 2014); Ellis M. Knight, 
Transforming Healthcare Delivery Through Value-Based Care Design, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. 
(Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-
administration/transforming-healthcare-delivery-through-value-based-care-design.html 
(highlighting the importance of value-based care redesign). 
 2 See Michael Weiner & Paul Biondich, The Influence of Information Technology on 
Patient-Physician Relationships, 21 (Supp. 1) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED., S35, S36-37 (2006), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1484834/pdf/jgi_307.pdf (examining the 
evolution of the physician-patient relationship as a result of technology). 
 3 See, e.g., Payment Reform and New Models of Care, RAND CORP., 
http://www.rand.org/health/key-topics/aca/payment-reform.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) 
(reviewing various alternative methods of payment); Suzanne Delbanco, The Payment Reform 
Landscape: Overview, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/06/the-payment-reform-landscape-overview 
(summarizing the payment reform landscape across the American health care industry). 
 4 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. 
 5 An understanding of the financial aspects of health care is critical, as it relates to almost 
any policy discussion focused on reform or improvement. A fundamental overview is 
provided infra Part I.A.2. 
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evolving state has forced more and more health care providers6 to seek out various 
types of affiliations with other organizations to mitigate the effects of these industry-
wide shifts. Examples exist almost everywhere in the United States, from western 
Pennsylvania to northern California.7 Antitrust implications are inevitable given the 
increased level of system integration.  
Though opinions vary, health care provider integration has the potential to 
deliver real benefits to patients and communities across the United States.8 Despite 
those benefits, strict enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act9 can prevent such 
                                                           
 6 Information related to the definition and classification of health care providers is 
presented infra Part I.A.1. 
 7 See e.g., Phil Galewitz, Is Bigger Better? Idaho Hospital Battle a Microcosm of Debate 
over Industry Consolidation, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/idaho-hospital-health-care-consolidation-hospitals 
(summarizing various instances of hospital and health system consolidation, including 
examples in Idaho, Pittsburgh, and northern California); Anna Wilde Mathews & John W. 
Miller, Health-Care Rivals Battle for Patients in Pittsburgh, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812904577295901619123904 
(exploring health care market dynamics in western Pennsylvania); Dan Verel, Prime 
Healthcare Sues SEIU-UHW Amid Acquisition Talks with Daughters of Charity, MEDCITY 
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://medcitynews.com/2014/09/prime-healthcare-sues-seiu-uhw-
amid-acquisition-talks-daughters-charity (summarizing a proposed transaction between 
California health care providers and a union’s efforts to prevent it); Managing and Evaluating 
Rapid-Cycle Process Improvements as Vehicles for Hospital System Redesign, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (2007), http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/final-
reports/rapidcycle/rapidcycle1.html (providing examples of innovation and change at one 
health system as a microcosm of the entire health care industry). 
 8 See infra Part II. 
 9 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). The statute’s text reads as follows: 
  No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall 
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital 
and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall 
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in 
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly. 
  No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or 
other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons 
engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the 
effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the 
voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, 
or to tend to create a monopoly. 
  . . . . 
  Nothing contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right 
heretofore legally acquired:  
  Provided,  
  That nothing in this section shall be held or construed to authorize or make lawful 
anything heretofore prohibited or made illegal by the antitrust laws, nor to exempt any 
person from the penal provisions thereof or the civil remedies therein provided. 
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mergers and acquisitions if the Federal Trade Commission predicts anticompetitive 
effects.10 In an effort to balance antitrust enforcement and the high-level priorities 
associated with health care reform, strict enforcement of section 7 should be 
reevaluated when health care transactions fall under scrutiny. The FTC’s antitrust 
enforcement should be adjusted to support government and industry efforts to 
contain rising health care costs11 and improve clinical quality.12 Congress can 
accomplish this by passing legislation that allows for a narrow statutory exemption 
to enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act for health care transactions that (1) 
demonstrate likely cost savings or efficiencies, (2) are focused on enhancing quality 
or patient outcomes, and (3) are aimed at enhancing or maintaining existing health 
care service offerings. Such a statutory exemption would permit transactions similar 
to the example13 discussed later in this Note but would avoid substantial degradation 
of antitrust regulatory authority and its associated consumer protections. 
This Note is set forth in four parts. Part I.A begins with background information 
related to the health care industry, including key concepts and terms, industry trends, 
and an overview of the health care provider response to health care reform. Part I.B 
provides a summary of antitrust law and enforcement, including applicable statutes 
that create FTC jurisdiction and how the FTC conducts antitrust analysis. Part I.C is 
an in-depth review of a recent health care transaction in Idaho, in which the FTC 
won the dissolution of the transaction in federal court. This case exemplifies how 
health care providers are attempting to integrate and how the FTC’s authority can 
curtail such ventures. 
Part II.A begins with the financial rationale in support of a statutory exemption to 
section 7 enforcement and cites the current and past performance of the health care 
industry, the industry’s capital needs, and the difficult transition from volume-to-
value-based compensation as support. Part II.B continues with quality-based 
rationale, including the existing fragmentation of the current health care system and 
emphasizing effective and efficient health care as a critical consumer protection. Part 
II.C presents additional support regarding the maintenance of existing health care 
services and the value of integrated health care delivery as it relates to government-
sponsored innovation projects. Finally, Part II.D, sets forth a new standard for FTC 
evaluation should the proposed statutory exemption be adopted. The Note concludes 
with a brief summation and conclusion. 
                                                           
Id. 
 10 The FTC’s ability to investigate and potentially prevent transactions from occurring 
based on predicted anticompetitive effects is a critical component of the agency’s regulatory 
authority. See infra Part I.B. 
 11 Key trend information is presented infra Part I.A.2. 
 12 Improved clinical quality remains a constant focus among health care providers as well 
as government entities. See, e.g., About the National Quality Strategy (NQS), AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/workingforquality/about.htm (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2015); Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, In Focus: Improving Patient Flow – In and 
Out of Hospitals and Beyond, COMMONWEALTH FUND: QUALITY MATTERS (Oct./Nov. 2013), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletters/quality-matters/2013/october-
november/in-focus-improving-patient-flow; see also infra Part II.B. 
 13 For an example of the FTC’s scrutiny involving the acquisition of Saltzer Medical 
Group by St. Luke’s Health System, see infra Part I.C. 
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I. THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY AND ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 
A. The Health Care Industry 
1. Essential Concepts and Terminology 
Before examining current and emerging health care trends, it is necessary to 
develop a fundamental understanding of core industry-specific concepts and 
terminology. An appropriate starting point is the definition of a health care provider. 
According to the HIPAA Privacy Rules, “health care provider means a . . . provider 
of medical or health services, and any other person or organization who furnishes, 
bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business.”14 For the purposes 
of this Note, the term “provider” will be used in reference to organizations or 
institutions as opposed to individual clinicians. 
One provider group that has grown substantially throughout the United States is 
the integrated delivery system. An integrated delivery system is often a provider or 
group of providers that come together under some legal structure in an effort to 
better manage health care delivery.15 Though there is no specific organizational 
model, integrated delivery systems often partner or contract with a health plan to 
further coordinate the full continuum of care.16 Integrated delivery systems vary in 
scope and size, but are widely considered to be a tool capable of controlling health 
care costs, increasing efficiency, and improving clinical quality.17 As will be 
examined in Part I.C, St. Luke’s Health System is an example of an integrated 
delivery system, along with many others across the United States.18 
                                                           
 14 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2015) (internal citations omitted). 
 15 See Wenke Hwang et al., Effects of Integrated Delivery System on Cost and Quality, 19 
AM. J. MANAGED CARE e175, 176 (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.ajmc.com/journals/issue/2013/2013-1-vol19-n5/effects-of-integrated-delivery-
system-on-cost-and-quality. 
 16 Eric R. Wagner & Peter R. Kongstvedt, Types of Managed Care Organizations and 
Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED CARE 36 (Peter R. 
Kongstvedt, ed., 6th ed. 2013); see also ESSENTIAL HOSPS. INST., INTEGRATED HEALTH CARE 
LITERATURE REV. 1-2 (2013), http://essentialhospitals.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Integrated-Health-Care-Literature-Review-Webpost-8-22-13-CB.pdf 
(listing definitions for integrated delivery systems). Additional common characteristics 
include shared economic and clinical accountability, increased alignment and efficiency, and 
coordinated and patient-centered care processes. See id. All of the aforementioned 
organizational and clinical qualities imply a somewhat sizable scale within the integrated 
delivery system’s geographic market and breadth of available services. The example outlined 
infra Part II.C is an example of two providers attempting to integrate for similar purposes and 
results. 
 17 See, e.g., How CHI is Building and Buying Its Own Insurance Plan, ADVISORY BD. CO. 
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2013/03/27/how-chi-is-building-and-
buying-its-own-insurance-plan (citing an example of a large, multi-state health system 
launching an insurance product in an effort to improve costs).   
 18 See St. Luke’s Health System, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form 
990), http://news.stlukesblogs.org/files/2013/04/SLHS-Form-990-FY-13-PI-Copy.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2015) (indicating the health system’s corporate structure, as filed with the 
Internal Revenue Service); see also Leigh Page, 50 Integrated Delivery Systems to Know, 
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-
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In addition to common organizational structures, a basic overview of the 
payment system is of equal importance. Generally, a payer is an “entit[y] other than 
the patient that finance[s] or reimburse[s] the cost of health services.”19 In most 
cases, a payer is an insurance carrier, other third-party payer, or health plan sponsor, 
such as an employer or union. Notwithstanding commercial insurers,20 the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) is the single largest insurance payer in 
the United States.21 CMS provides insurance coverage for nearly 123 million 
Americans.22 That number is estimated to grow following the Affordable Care Act’s 
expansion of insurance coverage under Medicare and Medicaid.23 CMS’s importance 
in health care cannot be understated. On top of the fact that it covers a substantial 
portion of the United States’ insured population,24 it sets an important fee schedule 
for health services.25 Formally referred to as the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, 
private insurance payers often base their own payment rates on these CMS 
benchmarks.26 
The Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and other payer fee schedules have been 
the primary drivers of health care’s financial outlook under the fee-for-service 
payment model that has been in place for the last several decades.27 Fee-for-service 
                                                           
physician-relationships/50-integrated-delivery-systems-to-know.html (listing numerous 
integrated delivery systems across the United States and reviewing their corresponding 
organizational models). 
 19 Payer, MOSBY’S DENTAL DICTIONARY 497 (2d ed. 2008). 
 20 Examples of large private insurers include UnitedHealth Group, Kaiser Foundation 
Group, Aetna Group, and many others. See Evi Heilbrunn, Top Health Insurance Companies, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 5, 2014), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/health-
insurance/articles/2013/12/16/top-health-insurance-companies (listing the largest health 
insurers in the United States in terms of market share). 
 21 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS ROADMAPS OVERVIEW 1, 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-
Instruments/QualityInitiativesGenInfo/downloads/RoadmapOverview_OEA_1-16.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2015). 
 22 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR 
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 2 (2014), http://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-
Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2015-CJ-Final.pdf (reviewing CMS’s scope 
and financial needs). 
 23 See id. at 1. 
 24 See Heath Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population (last visited Sept. 13, 2015). 
 25 See Overview of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule Search, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/apps/physician-fee-schedule/overview.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2015). 
 26 See Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare and Private Insurers: 
Growth Rates in Spending over Three Decades, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 230, 231-33 (Mar./Apr. 
2003), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/22/2/230.full.pdf. 
 27 See James C. Capretta, The Role of Medicare Fee-for-Service in Inefficient Health Care 
Delivery, AM. ENTER. INST. & ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., 3 (2013), 
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/-the-role-of-medicare-feeforservice-in-
inefficient-health-care-delivery_141413376272.pdf; see also Jeffrey Clemens, How Medicare 
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is a fairly straightforward payment methodology. Providers bill and are compensated 
by insurance payers for the procedures they conduct based on a predetermined rate.28 
Despite its prevalence, fee-for-service is being pushed to the side to make room for 
value-based payment models.   
Value-based models often compensate providers a predetermined amount for 
delivering a desired outcome, regardless of the particularized services needed to do 
so.29 As expected, this drastic shift is causing considerable disruption across the 
industry and forcing health care providers to take on additional financial risk.30 
Despite the challenges involved with its adoption, value-based reimbursement is the 
most promising way to drive down health care costs.31 Examples currently being 
piloted include capitation,32 accountable care organizations,33 and bundled 
payments.34 
2. Key Health Care Trends 
As outlined previously, the administrative and financial aspects of the American 
health care system clearly illustrate the industry’s complexity. Tension between 
consistent and emerging trends further complicates matters. The intersection of 
                                                           
Shapes the US Health Sector, ECON. IN ACTION (May 6, 2014), 
http://economics.ucsd.edu/economicsinaction/issue-10/headline.php (emphasizing Medicare’s 
impact on private payment systems). 
 28 Fee for Service, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/fee-for-service 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2015). 
 29 For further discussion of this concept, see infra Parts II.A.2, 3. 
 30 This concept will be further reviewed infra Part II.A. 
 31 See HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, VALUE IN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT STATE AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 28-29 (2011), https://www.hfma.org/ValueProject/Phase1 (download 
“Value in Health Care”).  
 32 Capitation is a method of reimbursement where the provider, hospital, or health plan is 
paid a fixed amount per patient and is expected to provide all necessary covered services at no 
additional charge. BARRY D. ALEXANDER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 3 (Am. 
Health Lawyers Ass’n ed., 4th ed. 2008). Total or global capitation describes when an 
organization receives capitation for all medical services, institutional and professional. Id. at 
30. 
 33 “Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are groups of . . . providers, who come 
together voluntarily to give coordinated high quality care to their . . . patients. The goal of 
coordinated care is to ensure that patients . . . get the right care at the right time, while 
avoiding unnecessary duplication of services and preventing medical errors. When an ACO 
succeeds in both delivering high-quality care and spending health care dollars more wisely, it 
will share in the savings it achieves.” Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/ACO/index.html?redirect=/ACO (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) (emphasis omitted).  
 34 Bundled payments “assign[ ] a fixed payment to cover a set of services, such as a 
surgery or a patient’s diabetes care, over a defined time period. Bundled payments encourage 
providers to manage costs, while meeting standards of high-quality care.” Bundled Payment: 
The Quest for Simplicity in Pricing and Tying Payment to Quality, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND. (June 2013), http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2013/06/bundled-payment--the-
quest-for-simplicity-in-pricing-and-tying-p.html.  
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
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health care reform, antitrust law, and provider consolidation underscore the 
significance of three primary trend categories. First, as with any topic involving 
health care, spending and financial trends top the list in order of importance. Second, 
care coordination and quality follow accordingly. Third, the category driving much 
of the industry’s disruption, is the transition from volume to value. 
When it comes to American health care costs, there is widespread agreement that 
the industry is not financially sustainable.35 As of October 1, 2015, the U.S. Census 
Bureau estimated the national resident population to be roughly 321,862,610.36 The 
World Bank estimated that American gross national income per capita was $55,20037 
and the United States’ gross domestic product (“GDP”) was $17.42 trillion.38 
Looking specifically at health care, per capita spending is estimated at $9,146.39 
Further, aggregated health care expenditures account for approximately 17.1% of the 
United States’ GDP.40 Experts forecast that number to reach 19.3% by 2023.41 
For purposes of comparison, the United States is often ranked at or near the 
bottom in terms of health care costs and efficiency among industrialized nations. For 
example, per capita health care spending in Canada ($5,718), France ($4,864), 
Germany ($5,006), and the United Kingdom ($3,598) is, on average, close to fifty 
                                                           
 35 See generally SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., THE UNSUSTAINABLE COST OF HEALTH CARE 
(2009), http://ssab.gov/portals/0/documents/TheUnsustainableCostofHealthCare_graphics.pdf; 
Loren Adler & G. William Hoagland, What is Driving U.S. Health Care Spending? America’s 
Unsustainable Health Care Cost Growth, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/what-driving-us-health-care-spending-
america%E2%80%99s-unsustainable-health-care-cost-growth; Rising Health Care Costs Are 
Unsustainable, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/businesscase/reasons/rising.html (last updated 
Oct. 23, 2013). 
 36 Monthly Population Estimates for the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. 
 37 GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).  
 38 United States, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2015).  
 39 Health Expenditure Per Capita, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PCAP/countries (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).“Total 
health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditures as a ratio of total 
population. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative), family 
planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but does not 
include provision of water and sanitation.” Id.  
 40 Health Expenditure, Total (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS/countries (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
 41 Andrea M. Sisko et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2013-23: Faster 
Growth Expected with Expanded Coverage and Improving Economy, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1841 
(Sept. 2014), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2014/08/27/hlthaff.2014.0560.   
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percent lower.42 Aggregated health care expenditures as a percent of GDP are 
similarly low for the same countries.43  
From a budgetary perspective, the United States’ deficit has decreased over the 
last few years; however, if current tax laws and federal spending remain the same, 
that trend will reverse as a result of revenue growing at a slower rate than 
spending.44 Though progress has been made related to the federal deficit, President 
Barack Obama’s proposed budget for 2014 contained a $744 billion shortfall.45 
Within that budget, federal funds allocated for Social Security, Medicare, and health 
spending were $866 billion, $531 billion, and $443 billion, respectively.46 Aside 
from the raw numbers, total health care expenditures have steadily increased over the 
last several decades.47 In most cases, the annual percentage growth of health care 
expenditures has outpaced growth of the national economy.48 
Despite such drastic spending rates, the United States is consistently mediocre 
compared with many of its industrialized peers in terms of health outcomes.49 The 
United States has lower adult life expectancy, higher infant mortality rates, and 
higher rates of obesity than a host of European countries.50 Several factors contribute 
                                                           
 42 See Health Expenditure Per Capita, supra note 39. 
 43 Aggregated health care expenditures as a percent of GDP: Canada (10.9%), France 
(11.7%), Germany (11.3%), and United Kingdom (9.4%). See id.  
 44 See CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 
TO 2024, 2, 16 (2014), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-
2014/reports/45653-OutlookUpdate_2014_Aug.pdf (summarizing updates to the federal 
budget and deficit forecasts).  
 45 Breaking Down the 2014 Budget, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/presidential-budget-2014.  
 46 Id.  
 47 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COST 
GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/healthcostreport_final_noembargo_v2.pdf 
(reviewing trends in health care, including multiple decades of increased health care spending 
prior to the Affordable Care Act’s passage).  
 48 See Jean P. Drouin et al., Heatlh Care Costs: A Market-Based View, MCKINSEY Q., 
Sept. 2008, at 1, 3. 
 49 Generally speaking, health outcomes data are used to measure and compare either the 
prevalence of certain disease processes or the rate of treatment success across various patient 
populations. Common outcome measures include cardiovascular deaths, diabetes, infant 
mortality, obesity, and cancer deaths. See, e.g., America’s Health Rankings, UNITED HEALTH 
FOUND., http://www.americashealthrankings.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
 50 See Tae Kuen Kim & Shannon R. Lane, Government Health Expenditure and Public 
Health Outcomes: A Comparative Study Among 17 Countries and Implications for U.S. 
Health Care Reform, 3 AM. J. CONTEMP. RES. No. 9, 10-11 (2013); David A. Squires, 
Explaining High Health Care Spending in the United States: An International Comparison of 
Supply, Utilization, Prices, and Quality, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 2012), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2012/May/159
5_Squires_explaining_high_hlt_care_spending_intl_brief.pdf.   
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to the rising price of American health care – including pharmaceuticals51 and 
medical technology52 – but the inverse relationship between spending and the quality 
of patient health and outcomes is problematic. Rising costs and lagging quality have 
resulted in CMS ratcheting down payment rates in an effort to control spending.53 
Private payers have followed suit,54 making financial performance in a fee-for-
service setting more difficult for health care providers. This trend continued 
following the passage of the Affordable Care Act.55  
3. Provider Response to Health Care Reform 
At a high level, the Affordable Care Act is aimed at accomplishing three things: 
(1) increased individual access to insurance and health care services, (2) improved 
quality of care provided to individuals, and (3) accomplishing both at an overall 
lower cost.56 In an effort to advance those three aims, the Affordable Care Act 
includes various provisions and components to promote the delivery of value-based 
                                                           
 51 See Parija Kavilanz, 6 Reasons Health Care Costs Keep Going Up, CNN MONEY (July 
12, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/12/news/economy/health-care-costs.  
 52 Id.; see also Louis Goodman & Timothy Norbeck, Who’s to Blame for Our Rising 
Healthcare Costs? FORBES (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/04/03/whos-to-blame-for-our-rising-healthcare-
costs. 
 53 Helen Adamopoulos, 100 Things to Know About Medicare Reimbursement, BECKER’S 
HOSP. CFO (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/100-things-to-
know-about-medicare-reimbursement.html; see also Merrill Matthews, Doctors Face a 24% 
Pay Cut in Both Medicare and Medicaid Reimbursements, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2013/12/02/doctors-facing-a-24-pay-cut-in-
both-medicare-and-medicaid-reimbursements. 
 54 See Jeffrey Bendix, Private Payers Re-Examining Reimbursement, MEDICAL ECON. 
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-
economics/news/modernmedicine/modern-medicine-feature-articles/private-payers-re-
examining-r?page=full.  
 55 See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
UPDATE: IMPLEMENTING MEDICARE COST SAVINGS, http://www.cms.gov/apps/docs/aca-
update-implementing-medicare-costs-savings.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2015); Medicare 
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, HEALTH POL’Y BRIEFS, HEALTH AFFS. (Nov. 12, 
2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=102.  
 56 See Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/index.html (last updated Nov. 18, 2014) 
(summarizing the key features of the Affordable Care Act). This tripartite framework is 
commonly referred to as the Triple Aim. The IHI Triple Aim, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE 
IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2015). Donald Berwick, M.D., a physician who went on to lead both the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
under President Barack Obama, initially developed this concept. Profiles in Leadership: Don 
Berwick, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, 
http://www.ihi.org/education/ihiopenschool/resources/pages/profilesinleadershipdonberwick.a
spx (last visited Oct. 28, 2015). The Triple Aim is a recurring theme in health care policy 
development, analysis, and reform. Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, supra.  
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care.57 From a provider’s prospective, this further emphasizes the move away from a 
fee-for-service business model to a value-based compensation business model. This 
kind of transition has proven difficult for many health care providers, especially 
stand-alone hospitals, 58 smaller health systems, and independent physician 
practices.59 To minimize the financial risks associated with the volume-to-value 
transition, many providers need to broaden the patient populations they serve, spread 
their financial risks as much as possible, and invest in more powerful information 
technology.60 The result has been a significant increase in the number of mergers, 
acquisitions, and joint ventures among hospitals, health systems, and other types of 
health care providers.61 
B. Antitrust Law and Enforcement 
1. Key Statutes and Purposes 
The increase in provider merger and acquisition activity has caught the attention 
of federal and state antitrust regulators.62 Before reviewing the standard approach to 
antitrust analysis and enforcement, a brief review of the FTC’s authority is 
appropriate. The FTC’s jurisdiction derives from multiple federal statutes, including 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) and the Clayton Act.  
The FTC was created in September of 1914 when President Woodrow Wilson 
signed the FTC Act into law.63 The purpose of the legislation was to create an 
agency to protect consumers and promote marketplace competition.64 For purposes 
of enforcement, the FTC Act provides the FTC with investigative power and the 
authority to protect various forms of consumer activities, such as prohibiting unfair 
business practices.65 The Clayton Act was ratified less than a month later in October 
of 1914.66 Specifically, section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes contracts, mergers, 
                                                           
 57 See Summary of the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-act. 
 58 See Kenneth L. Davis, Opinion, Hospital Mergers Can Lower Costs and Improve 
Medical Care, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kenneth-l-davis-
hospital-mergers-can-lower-costs-and-improve-medical-care-1410823048. 
 59 See David C. Pate, Hospital-Physician Relations in a Post-Health Care Reform 
Environment, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 7, 18-19 (2012). 
 60 See id. at 14-16. 
 61 Ayla Ellison, Should Hospitals Merge to Improve Care, Lower Costs? BECKER’S HOSP. 
REV. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-and-
valuation/should-hospitals-merge-to-improve-care-lower-costs.html. 
 62 For an example resulting from increased attention, see infra Part I.C.  
 63 About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2015).  
 64 Id. 
 65 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).  
 66 About the FTC, supra note 63. 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
94 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:83 
 
and acquisitions that decrease competition and enhance the likelihood of 
monopoly.67 
Essential to understanding the Clayton Act’s enforcement, the Supreme Court of 
the United States held that Congress intentionally used the word “may” in section 7 
“to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.”68 Lower courts 
expanded upon that notion and hold that section 7 requires a prediction of 
anticompetitive effects with doubts to be resolved against the transaction.69 Though 
the agency and its enacting laws are more than one hundred years old, the FTC has 
as much authority as ever. Further, section 7 remains a substantial source of federal 
authority to prevent or dissolve mergers and acquisitions considered anticompetitive. 
2. Antitrust Analysis and Enforcement 
As a subdivision of the larger agency, the Bureau of Competition leads FTC 
enforcement of antitrust laws.70 The Bureau of Competition investigates and seeks 
legal remedies in both federal court and in front of administrative law judges.71 The 
FTC and the Bureau of Competition typically exercise their authority by reviewing 
pre-merger and post-merger transactions, by issuing advisory opinions, and by 
conducting administrative rulemaking.72 Aside from the procedural aspects of 
                                                           
 67 See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 68 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). 
 69 See, e.g., FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.). 
 70 About the Bureau of Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-competition/about-bureau-competition (last visited Oct. 28, 2015). 
The Department of Justice maintains certain authority to enforce antitrust laws, but FTC 
enforcement will remain the primary focus of this Note. 
 71 Id. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 made possible the appointment of 
administrative law judges. See 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2012) (listing the process and authority for 
conducting hearings and presiding employees). A significant number of federal and state 
administrative agencies employ administrative law judges, including the FTC, the Department 
of Health and Human Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Drug 
Enforcement Agency. See Agencies Employing Administrative Law Judges, ASS’N OF ADMIN. 
LAW JUDGES, http://www.aalj.org/agencies-employing-administrative-law-judges (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2015). The U.S. Office of Personnel Management has a non-delegable responsibility 
to administer the administrative law judge examination, the method by which various 
government agencies make administrative law judge service appointments. Administrative 
Law Judges, U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/services-for-
agencies/administrative-law-judges/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). Administrative law judges 
“serve as independent impartial triers of fact in formal proceedings requiring a decision on the 
record after the opportunity for a hearing.” Classification & Qualifications, U.S. OFFICE OF 
PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-
qualifications/general-schedule-qualification-standards/specialty-areas/administrative-law-
judge-positions (last visited Oct. 28, 2015). Though referred to as “impartial triers of fact,” the 
objectivity of administrative law judges is sometimes called into question because the 
employing agency can initially function as both prosecutor and judge. See, e.g., Ann Wise, 
Louisiana’s Division of Administrative Law: An Independent Administrative Hearings 
Tribunal, 68 LA. L. REV. 1169, 1198 (2008). 
 72 See generally Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2015).  
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enforcement, the FTC and Department of Justice lay out their principal analytical 
techniques in their jointly published Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Guidelines”).73  
The principles in the Guidelines are simply a framework for analysis as opposed 
to a defined step-by-step procedure. According to the document itself, the merger 
review process is “fact-specific” and guided by the agencies’ collective experience.74 
“The Agencies . . . apply a range of analytical tools to the reasonably available and 
reliable evidence to evaluate competitive concerns in a limited period of time.”75 
Even though much of the analysis is uniform, the FTC’s approach is based on the 
unique facts and circumstances of each individual transaction. Most importantly, 
recall that the Supreme Court held that the FTC and the Bureau of Competition are 
able to base their analysis on probabilities as opposed to certainties.76 Likewise, any 
doubts arising from the analysis are to be resolved against the transaction in 
question.77 
When reviewing pre-merger competitive effects, the FTC considers enhanced 
market power in the form of increased price, reduced output, or other harms to 
consumers that typically result from decreased competition.78 The FTC also 
considers non-price related adverse market effects of mergers, including reduced 
product quality, reduced variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation.79 If the 
FTC analysis takes place after a merger, similar to the example presented in the 
following section,80 actual as well as potential adverse effects are taken into 
account.81 Whether pre- or post-merger, the FTC’s level of regulatory scrutiny 
remains the same. 
Another key aspect of the Bureau of Competition’s analysis is the definition of 
the relevant market.82 The definition of a market is comprised of the following 
                                                           
 73 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf 
[hereinafter GUIDELINES]. “These Guidelines should be read with the awareness that merger 
analysis does not consist of uniform application of a single methodology.” Id. at 1. 
  In addition to the Guidelines, the FTC and Department of Justice have published policy 
statements specific to health care transactions. Interestingly, the most recent publication date 
is 1996 and does not include specific guidance for integrated delivery systems despite their 
prevalence across the United States. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/0000.pdf. 
 74 GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 1. 
 75 Id. “The Agencies consider many sources of evidence in their merger analysis. The 
most common sources of reasonably available and reliable evidence are the merging parties, 
customers, other industry participants, and industry observers.” Id. at 4. 
 76 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). 
 77 FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (1989) (Posner, J.). 
 78 GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 2. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See infra Part I.C. 
 81 Guidelines, supra note 73, at 3. 
 82 See id. at 7-8. 
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elements: (1) the line of commerce, (2) the geographic section of the country, (3) the 
market participants, and (4) market concentration.83 These elements “illuminate” the 
merger’s competitive effects.84 Looking specifically at the product market, the 
Bureau of Competition reviews the merging firms’ primary product, or service, and 
defines a relevant group or substitute of products to analyze the competitive effects.85 
Just as important, the Bureau of Competition conducts a geographic market review, 
which establishes limits related to consumer willingness or ability to travel to find an 
alternative product or service or substitute.86 Product and geographic market analyses 
are of great importance when it comes to the health care sector because of the limited 
availability of certain health care services and the breadth of the involved providers’ 
service areas. 
As a potential mitigating factor, the Bureau of Competition entertains evidence 
related to gains in efficiency presented by the merging parties. The Bureau of 
Competition weighs potential efficiencies against anticompetitive effects that may 
result from mergers because the merged entities often have the ability to achieve 
significant improvements in terms of price, quality, service offerings, and product 
offerings.87 From time to time, the Bureau of Competition acknowledges that 
“efficient” mergers even enhance the competitive landscape by combining 
complementary assets.88 However, the agencies only credit likely or resulting 
efficiencies if they are improbable in absence of the merger.89 Thus, the efficiencies 
must be “merger specific.”90 Further, according to the Guidelines, vague or 
speculative efficiency claims are not considered valid unless they can be verified by 
reasonable means.91 Still, the FTC views such efficiency claims with considerable 
skepticism.92 
                                                           
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 8-12. 
 86 Id. at 13. 
 87 Id. at 29-31. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id.; see also FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that 
efficiencies resulting from mergers “must be efficiencies that cannot be achieved by either 
company alone because, if they can, the merger’s asserted benefits can be achieved without 
the concomitant loss of a competitor”). 
 91 GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 30. 
 92 See id. As presented in the Guidelines, efficiencies are viewed with such skepticism 
because 
  Efficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the 
information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms. 
Moreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the merging firms 
may not be realized. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the merging firms to substantiate 
efficiency claims so that the Agencies can verify by reasonable means the likelihood 
and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved 
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C. An Example of When Law and Policy Collide 
Taking into account the concepts, trends, legal and regulatory authority set forth 
in the preceding part, there are multiple examples of antitrust enforcement blocking 
or dissolving mergers and acquisitions across the health care industry.93 One 
example took place in Idaho, recently. This example clearly illustrates the challenges 
present throughout the American health care industry and how those challenges can 
be exacerbated by strict enforcement of section 7. 
St. Luke’s Health System (“St. Luke’s”) is the only Idaho-based not-for-profit 
health system.94 Headquartered in Boise, St. Luke’s is comprised of seven hospitals95 
and multiple freestanding health centers.96 St. Luke’s also employs or contracts with 
approximately five hundred physicians across various clinical specialties.97 St. 
Luke’s service area includes a majority of southern Idaho as well as parts of eastern 
Oregon,98 and is by far Idaho’s largest provider of health care services.99 
Roughly twenty miles east of Boise, Saltzer Medical Group (“Saltzer”) is based 
in the picturesque suburb of Nampa.100 Historically known for high-quality patient 
care, Saltzer is Idaho’s largest independent physician practice.101 In addition to its 
main clinic and headquarters in Nampa, Saltzer maintains multiple practice locations 
                                                           
(and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and 
incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific. 
Id. 
 93 In addition to the forthcoming in-depth case review, another recent example of the 
FTC’s exercise of antitrust authority in the health care field involved ProMedica Heath 
System in Toledo, Ohio. See ProMedica Health Sys. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 
2014) (denying ProMedica’s petition to review the FTC’s order for ProMedica to divest a 
local community hospital in a nearby suburb). Note that this ProMedica case included the use 
of an FTC administrative law judge. Id. 
 94 About St. Luke’s Health System, ST. LUKE’S HEALTH SYS., 
http://www.stlukesonline.org/about_us (last visited Aug. 31, 2015). 
 95 See List of Locations, ST. LUKE’S HEALTH SYS., 
http://www.stlukesonline.org/about_us/locations.php (last visited Aug. 31, 2015). 
 96 See id. 
 97 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Nos. 1:12-CV-
00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *3 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 
778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 98 Id. 
 99 See Galewitz, supra note 7 (referring to St. Luke’s as Idaho’s largest not-for-profit 
health system).  
 100 Location & Clinics, SALTZER MED. GRP., http://www.saltzermed.com/locations (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
 101 St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *3. 
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in Meridian, Caldwell, and Boise.102 Slightly more than forty physicians work across 
Saltzer facilities, and most of them practice primary care medicine.103 
For years, and in line with industry trends,104 senior leadership at St. Luke’s and 
Saltzer saw the increasing need for more integrated health care delivery at an overall 
lower cost.105 Saltzer believed it needed to make multiple modifications to its long-
standing administrative practices, including a transition to a value-based 
compensation model and an upgrade to its electronic health record (“EHR”) 
system.106 Unfortunately, Saltzer did not have the resources necessary to take on that 
level of financial risk.107 Nor could Saltzer make its needed level of investment in 
technology infrastructure without partnering with a larger organization.108 
Following multiple failed attempts to informally collaborate with other health 
care providers—including one with an out-of-state parent—Saltzer determined that 
an affiliation with a local partner would likely yield positive results.109 In 2008, 
Saltzer and St. Luke’s executed a memorandum of understanding to establish an 
informal partnership focused on five specified areas of improvement.110 The five 
improvement areas were rooted in three overarching concepts: (1) improved access 
to high-quality medical care, (2) enhanced coordination of medical services, and (3) 
a streamlined care delivery model in two counties.111 
Although their collaboration was well intentioned, both parties admitted to 
minimal success because the “informal” relationship proved difficult to manage.112 
                                                           
 102 Location & Clinics, supra note 100. 
 103 St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *3. In terms of policy and patient care management, the 
importance of primary care medicine cannot be understated. Primary care providers are often 
considered the keystone for real and lasting health care reform and industry-wide 
improvement. See, e.g., Naomi Freundlich, Primary Care: Our First Line of Defense, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 12, 2013), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/health-reform-and-you/primary-care-our-
first-line-of-defense. Collaboration or integration between primary care medicine providers 
and other health care providers is essential. See id. “U.S. adults who have a primary care 
physician have 33 percent lower health care costs and 19 percent lower odds of dying than 
those who see only a specialist. As a nation, we would save $67 billion each year if everybody 
used a primary care provider as their usual source of care.” Id. 
 104 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 105 St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *3. 
 106 Id. at *3, *18. “EHRs are, at their simplest, digital (computerized) versions of patients’ 
paper charts. But EHRs, when fully up and running, are so much more than that. EHRs are 
real-time, patient-centered records. They make information available instantly, ‘whenever and 
wherever it is needed.’” Learn EHR Basics, OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH 
INFO. TECH., http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/learn-ehr-basics (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2015).    
 107 St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *3. 
 108 Id. at *3, *18. 
 109 Id. at *4. 
 110 Id.  
 111 Id.  
 112 Id. 
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In 2009, Saltzer approached St. Luke’s to explore a closer, more formal affiliation.113 
After nearly three years of extensive negotiations, St. Luke’s acquired Saltzer 
effective December 31, 2012.114 As part of the transaction, Saltzer, on behalf of its 
physicians, entered into a professional services agreement with St. Luke’s that 
included an exclusivity provision, an open referral policy,115 and a production-based 
compensation model intended to convert to a value-based model.116 
Saltzer’s leadership indicated that its primary motivation for approaching St. 
Luke’s was “to provide the best possible health care to the community.”117 Saltzer 
further emphasized that the transaction would result in St. Luke’s investment of time 
and resources in Canyon County and that St. Luke’s accepted the risk needed for 
Saltzer to convert to capitation.118 Last, Saltzer’s leadership noted that the affiliation 
with St. Luke’s would result in increased patient access to health care services, 
especially for the Medicare and Medicaid populations throughout its geographic 
service area.119 
Despite the emphasis on improvement of patient care, investment in 
infrastructure, and enhanced patient access, St. Luke’s acquisition of Saltzer quickly 
fell under scrutiny. In early 2013, two of St. Luke’s local competitors filed a joint 
complaint in federal court claiming the transaction had anticompetitive effects; a 
second complaint was filed soon after, this time by the Idaho Attorney General and 
the FTC.120 According to an FTC press release filed the same day as the complaint, 
“the combination of St. Luke’s and Saltzer would give it the market power to 
demand higher rates for health care services . . . ultimately leading to higher costs for 
health care consumers.”121 The FTC’s primary authority for making such an 
assertion: section 7 of the Clayton Act.122 
                                                           
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at *5. “Buying” physician referrals of patients and services is illegal under the fraud 
and anti-kickback statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012) (listing criminal penalties for acts 
involving federal health care programs); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (2010) (listing the limitations 
on certain physician referrals). The inclusion of such clear language in the Saltzer physicians’ 
professional services agreement supports the argument that the acquisition was intended to 
improve quality and patient care—even if it meant certain referrals leaving the St. Luke’s 
delivery system. 
 116 See St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *5.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id.; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 3 and accompanying text. 
 119 St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *6. 
 120 Id. at *1. 
 121 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and Idaho Attorney General Challenge St. 
Luke's Health System Acquisition of Saltzer Medical Group as Anticompetitive (Mar. 12, 
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/03/ftc-idaho-attorney-general-
challenge-st-lukes-health-systems. 
 122 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
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As previously indicated, section 7 makes mergers and acquisitions unlawful that 
“may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition, or tend . . . to create a monopoly.”123 
Thus, it is no real surprise that the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho ruled 
in favor of the FTC and summarily ordered St. Luke’s to divest itself of Saltzer.124 
Notwithstanding the district court’s decision to unwind the transaction, Chief Judge 
B. Lynn Winmill included the following in his conclusion: 
 Health care is at a crisis point. Nationally, quality lags far behind the 
inexorable rise in prices. This has created a groundswell of demand for 
change. One change universally recommended is to move away from fee-
for-service reimbursement and toward integrated care and risk-based 
reimbursement, where payment is made on the basis of patient outcomes, 
not the volume of services. This is a major change and is slowly being 
implemented. This period of change might be best described as being in 
an experimental stage, where hospitals and other providers are examining 
different organizational models, trying to find the best fit. To be part of 
this experimental wave moving toward integrated care, St. Luke’s and 
Saltzer agreed on the Acquisition. The Acquisition is an attempt by St. 
Luke’s and Saltzer to improve the quality of medical care. . . . In a world 
that was not governed by the Clayton Act, the best result might be to 
approve the Acquisition and monitor its outcome to see if the predicted 
price increases actually occurred. In other words, the Acquisition could 
serve as a controlled experiment. But the Clayton Act is in full force, and 
it must be enforced. The Act does not give the Court discretion to set it 
aside to conduct a health care experiment.125 
St. Luke’s appealed the district court’s decision, but the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.126 On the first page of its opinion, the 
Ninth Circuit echoed the district court’s reasoning that it is not the job of the courts 
to shape the desired or optimal future of the national health care system.127 A court’s 
role is simply to determine whether the merger in question violates the Clayton 
Act.128 It remains to be seen whether St. Luke’s will petition the Supreme Court of 
the United States for a writ of certiorari.  
                                                           
 123 Id. 
 124 St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *26. 
 125 Id. at *25 (paragraph breaks omitted). 
 126 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 793 
(9th Cir. 2015). 
 127 Id. at 781. 
 128 Id. The decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals further underscores that 
competition remains the primary focus of section 7 enforcement. Even when industry-specific 
benefits or improvements are possible or likely, market competition remains paramount: 
  But even if we assume that the claimed efficiencies were merger-specific, the 
defense would nonetheless fail. At most, the district court concluded that St. Luke’s 
might provide better service to patients after the merger. That is a laudable goal, but 
the Clayton Act does not excuse mergers that lessen competition or create monopolies 
simply because the merged entity can improve its operations. The district court did not 
clearly err in concluding that whatever else St. Luke’s proved, it did not demonstrate 
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II. WHY AN EXEMPTION TO SECTION 7 IS APPROPRIATE 
On its face, the district court’s St. Luke’s decision likely appears to be a 
straightforward and appropriate result of section 7 enforcement. However, this case 
and its surrounding facts do much more than provide a recent example of how the 
FTC approaches antitrust enforcement in the health care sector. This case illustrates 
the market and regulatory challenges impacting health care.129 Chief Judge Winmill, 
in his district court opinion, paraphrases pervading public opinion.130 He underscores 
the need for change, experimentation, and innovation when it comes to 
organizational models in the health care space.131 But the court’s ultimate decision—
divesture—is inconsistent with current federal health policy initiatives, including the 
Affordable Care Act. 
The Affordable Care Act is aimed at accomplishing three things: (1) increased 
individual access to health insurance and health care services, (2) improved quality 
of care provided to individuals, and (3) accomplishing both at an overall lower 
cost.132 By reviewing the facts and conclusions reached by the district court and the 
Ninth Circuit, the rationale for St. Luke’s acquisition of Saltzer is directly in line 
with these overarching goals. Yet the FTC’s enforcement of section 7 prevented the 
business relationship between St. Luke’s and Saltzer from coming to fruition and 
producing its intended results. This dichotomy presents a significant problem. 
Although opinions vary, this type of provider integration has the potential to 
deliver real benefits to patients and communities across the United States. Despite 
this potential, section 7’s enforcement can prevent mergers and acquisitions intended 
to coordinate care delivery, increase efficiency, and drive cost savings if the FTC 
“predicts” potential anticompetitive effects. In an effort to balance antitrust 
enforcement and the high-level priorities associated with health care reform, strict 
enforcement of section 7 should be reevaluated. FTC enforcement should support 
government and industry efforts to contain rising health care costs and improve 
clinical quality. This can be accomplished by Congress enacting legislation that 
allows for a narrow statutory exemption to enforcement of section 7. Such a 
statutory exemption would permit transactions similar to St. Luke’s attempted 
acquisition of Saltzer, while avoiding substantial degradation of antitrust regulatory 
authority and its associated consumer protections. 
Given the information presented, strict enforcement of section 7 does not align 
with federal and industry efforts to improve health care in terms of cost and quality. 
Mergers and acquisitions capable of delivering benefits to patients and the industry 
as a whole run the risk of being prevented or unwound unless legislative action is 
taken. A statutory exemption to enforcement of section 7 would allow certain 
appropriate transactions to occur. However, each transaction should have to meet the 
                                                           
that efficiencies resulting from the merger would have a positive effect on 
competition. 
Id. at 791-92. 
 129 See St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *25. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. 
 132 Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, supra note 56 (summarizing the key features 
of the Affordable Care Act). 
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following criteria: (1) demonstrate likely cost savings or efficiencies, (2) focus on 
enhancing quality or patient outcomes, and (3) aim to enhance or maintain existing 
health care service offerings (hereinafter “Proposed Exemption Criteria”). Despite 
arguments to the contrary, substantial rationale support this approach. 
A. Financial Rationale 
1. The Health Care Industry’s Current and Past Performance 
More than anything, the health care industry’s current and past financial 
performance provide the strongest support for exploring alternatives to bend the cost 
curve downward. As indicated, health care accounts for a substantial portion of per 
capita spending and gross domestic product in the United States.133 That is partially 
due to the current fee-for-service business model, where providers are incentivized 
to conduct more procedures, as opposed to delivering a specific patient outcome at 
the best possible financial value.134 Despite the proliferation of spending, lowered 
reimbursement rates have increased financial pressure on health care providers of all 
sizes.135 Such decreases are likely necessary for substantial cost savings across the 
industry; however, not all providers will be able to remain solvent without the help 
of larger, more financially stable organizations. Allowing mergers and acquisitions 
that meet the Proposed Exemption Criteria could help financially strained health care 
providers stabilize and move to more sustainable operating structures and 
reimbursement models.136 This could, in turn, drive improvement across the industry.   
2. Capital Requirements for Reinvestment in the System 
In addition to systemic financial challenges, health care has been and will 
continue to be a capital-intensive industry.137 Advancements in health care delivery, 
                                                           
 133 See supra discussion Part I.A.2. 
 134 See supra notes 25-28 and associated text related to fee-for-service payment. 
 135 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
 136 See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will Fix Health Care, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/the-strategy-that-will-fix-health-care. 
The authors indicate that a new industry-wide health care strategy should be focused on the 
following: 
  At its core is maximizing value for patients: that is, achieving the best outcomes at 
the lowest cost. We must move away from a supply-driven health care system 
organized around what physicians do and toward a patient-centered system organized 
around what patients need. We must shift the focus from the volume and profitability 
of services provided—physician visits, hospitalizations, procedures, and tests—to the 
patient outcomes achieved. And we must replace today’s fragmented system, in which 
every local provider offers a full range of services, with a system in which services for 
particular medical conditions are concentrated in health-delivery organizations and in 
the right locations to deliver high-value care.  
Id. 
 137 See Rene Letourneau, Capital Spending Reflects New Era in Healthcare, 
HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/FIN-
300783/Capital-Spending-Reflects-New-Era-in-Healthcare (referencing infrastructure 
enhancements and information technology as two examples of major capital expenditures 
among health care providers); John Marcille, A Conversation with Paul H. Keckley, PhD: 
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as well as technology, constantly require providers to make significant and frequent 
investments in new medical equipment, technology, and infrastructure.138 As 
exhibited by the St. Luke’s and Saltzer merger, Saltzer was incapable of investing in 
a new electronic health record system without the financial support of a larger 
organization.139 Such financial limitations are commonplace, but substantial 
investment is necessary for providers to transition to emerging value-based 
reimbursement models.140 Exempting mergers and acquisitions that meet the 
Proposed Exemption Criteria would give smaller or less financially capable health 
care providers greater opportunity to partner with larger organizations to deliver 
greater value to patients and communities as a whole.  
3. Transition from Volume to Value and the Realignment of Incentives 
Arguments for moving from volume- to value-based reimbursement can be found 
almost anywhere across the United States, including Chief Judge Winmill’s 
conclusion in St. Luke’s.141 To make this kind of transition, access to significant 
amounts of capital funding is required,142 as is institutional knowledge, and a 
population base that allows for financial risk to be spread appropriately.143 The 
volume-to-value transition presents a novel opportunity to align financial incentives 
for both payers and providers. Providers will be incentivized to provide quality and 
medically necessary care to patients as efficiently as possible. Payers, in turn, will 
                                                           
Clinical Perspective Critical to Health Care Reform, MANAGED CARE MAG. (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1202/1202.qna_keckley.html (referencing the 
capital needs among health plans and managed care organizations, which parallels the capital 
intensive nature of providers). 
 138 See, e.g., Beth Kutscher, UPMC Issuing $400 Million in Bonds to Fund Ongoing 
Projects, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140915/NEWS/309159939/upmc-issuing-400-
million-in-bonds-to-fund-ongoing-projects (indicating the health system’s capital spending 
will be focused on outpatient centers and technology upgrades in western Pennsylvania). 
 139 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Nos. 1:12-CV-
00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *3, *18 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014) 
aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 140 See The State of Value-Based Reimbursement and the Transition from Volume to Value 
in 2014, MCKESSON (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.mckesson.com/bps/bps-knowledge-
center/the-state-of-value-based-reimbursement-and-the-transition-from-volume-to-value-in-
2014 (noting several trends that point to the importance of information technology). 
 141 “Health care is at a crisis point. Nationally, quality lags far behind the 
inexorable rise in prices. This has created a groundswell of demand for change. One 
change universally recommended is to move away from fee-for-service 
reimbursement and toward integrated care and risk-based reimbursement, where 
payment is made on the basis of patient outcomes, not the volume of services.” St. 
Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *25. 
 142 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 143 See generally Population Health Solutions: Support for the Journey to Value-based 
Care, ADVISORY BD. CO., http://www.advisory.com/solutions/population-health (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2015) (detailing the firm’s approach to population health consulting and priorities 
providers should consider for success in value-based care delivery). 
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compensate those providers based on the value of their services. As a result, the 
patient receives better, more cost effective care. This could result in a renewed focus 
on patient outcomes that actually benefits all involved parties. Allowing transactions 
that meet the Proposed Exemption Criteria could advance these efforts by giving 
providers greater access to needed resources. 
B. Quality Rationale 
1. Fragmentation of the Current System and Misalignment of Providers 
Part of the reason for the United States’ rising health care costs and mediocre 
quality is the fragmented system.144 Care delivery is often conducted in “silos,” 
where various caregivers do not communicate effectively or share critical patient 
information.145 This can be partially improved through the use of robust technology 
systems as well as growing the size of a given provider network to include more 
clinicians who are vested in and working for a single entity.146 Granted, classical 
mergers and acquisitions are not the only ways to align caregivers of varying 
specialties;147 however, given the financial conditions of the health care industry as a 
whole, any opportunity for improved alignment and coordination should be 
thoroughly explored. Transactions that satisfy the Proposed Exemption Criteria 
support greater integration and coordination of care. 
2. Improved Health Care Quality as a Consumer Protection 
The federal antitrust laws were enacted as a form of consumer protection.148 To 
build on that lasting and meaningful principle, exploring new opportunities to afford 
Americans better access to and improved quality of health care services are 
substantial consumer protection efforts. Further, providing better care at an improved 
overall value is another substantial consumer benefit. These ideals align with the 
fundamental purposes of health care reform;149 however, the industry disruption 
caused by the Affordable Care Act has health care providers desperately trying to 
find new ways to improve financial and clinical performance. Even though some 
transactions might be considered anticompetitive from a pure section 7 perspective, 
transactions that meet the Proposed Exemption Criteria could be just as consumer-
oriented as the ideals encompassed by the antitrust laws themselves.  
                                                           
 144 See Alan C. Enthoven & Laura A. Tollen, Competition in Health Care: It Takes Systems 
to Pursue Quality and Efficiency, HEALTH AFFS. W5-420 (Sept. 7, 2005). 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/09/07/hlthaff.w5.420. 
 145 See id. at W5-428. 
 146 See generally id.  
 147 See, e.g., ESSENTIAL HOSPS. INST., INTEGRATED HEALTH CARE LITERATURE REVIEW 1-2, 
http://essentialhospitals.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Integrated-Health-Care-Literature-
Review-Webpost-8-22-13-CB.pdf (May 2013) (listing various definitions for integrated 
delivery systems). In addition, accountable care organizations are often considered a method 
for providers to align – but not necessarily merge – in an effort to control health spending and 
delivery quality health outcomes. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 148 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
 149 Recall the overarching principles of health care reform, as indicated supra Part I.A.3. 
Likewise, the idea of government-supported consumer protection clearly aligns with the 
concept of the Triple Aim. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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C. Access and Innovation Rationale 
1. Maintenance of Existing Services 
Because of health care’s financial pressures, maintaining existing health care 
services and resources will be a challenge for many providers in the future.150 Some 
will consolidate or be forced out of practice due to market forces.151  However, in 
rural or underserved areas, maintaining existing services is critical to community 
health.152 The Proposed Exemption Criteria may prove most beneficial in rural or 
underserved health care markets or those with minimal competition. This 
underscores the importance of the Proposed Exemption Criteria, especially the 
criterion related to the maintenance or enhancement of available health services. 
2. The Value of Integration and Government-sponsored Innovation Projects 
As briefly noted, the federal government values and promotes integration and 
coordination of health care delivery through various programs and projects.153 Some 
examples include accountable care organizations and bundled payment initiatives.154 
It is these types of programs that are designed to lower costs and drive value in 
health care delivery. If successful, they may be used on a broader scale or be 
implemented to a greater extent by private payers and organizations.155 Preventing 
transactions, like St. Luke’s, stifles organizational innovation and limits the 
opportunities for providers to participate and collaborate in government-sponsored 
and market-driven reimbursement experiments. Governmental as well as market-
driven efforts are equally imperative for lasting improvement across the industry. 
                                                           
 150 See supra notes 35, 44-48 and accompanying text.  
 151 See generally PHYSICIANS FOUND., HEALTH REFORM AND THE DECLINE OF PHYSICIAN 
PRIVATE PRACTICE (2010), 
http://www.physiciansfoundation.org/uploads/default/Health_Reform_and_the_Decline_of_P
hysician_Private_Practice.pdf; Peter Pavarini & Matt Lindsay, Health Care Reform Going 
Forward: What’s the Impact on Providers? BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/health-care-
reform-going-forward-whats-the-impact-on-providers.html. 
 152 See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMPROVING RURAL HEALTH: 
STATE POLICY OPTIONS (2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/RuralHealth_PolicyOptions_1113.pdf; Joseph R. 
Betancourt et al., Cultural Competence and Health Care Disparities: Key Perspectives and 
Trends, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 499 (Mar. 2005), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/24/2/499.short. 
 153 See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 154 See supra notes 33-34. 
 155 See NAT’L COMM. ON QUALITY ASSURANCE, NCQA ACCREDITATION OF ACCOUNTABLE 
CARE ORGANIZATIONS 1-3 (2013), 
http://www.ncqa.org/Portals/0/ACO%20Press%20Conference/ACO%20White%20Paper%20
Feb.%202013.pdf (noting how accountable care organizations can demonstrate readiness for 
accreditation).  
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D. A New Standard for Exemption 
As part of the recommended statutory exemption, certain existing antitrust 
concepts should be revised. For one, when the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, 
administrative law judges, or courts review efficiency defenses, efficiencies 
presented by merging entities should no longer be required to be “merger 
specific.”156 Given the health care industry’s financial challenges and issues with 
fragmentation, any benefits that might result from transactions that meet the 
Proposed Exemption Criteria should be viewed favorably because such transactions 
would support the overarching goals of bending the cost curve downward and 
improving care delivery. Therefore, when merging parties present potential 
efficiency defenses, they should be considered without regard to being merger 
specific.  
In addition, as long as the transaction aligns with the Proposed Exemption 
Criteria, the FTC, administrative law judges, and courts should weigh facts and 
resolve doubts related to anticompetitive effects in favor of the transaction. This is in 
contrast to the current approach where any uncertainties are resolved against the 
transaction.157 Similar to the comments made by Chief Judge Winmill in his district 
court opinion, favoring transactions that meet the Proposed Exemption Criteria 
would allow for controlled experiments and innovation in terms of organizational 
models.158 The elimination of the “merger specific” requirement for efficiencies and 
a new approach to resolving factual uncertainties would allow for only certain types 
of transactions to occur without undermining section 7’s larger purpose and 
authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The American health care system is in a prolonged financial crisis. As a country, 
the United States is spending more on health care and getting less value and positive 
health outcomes. Several policies and efforts are underway in an effort to drive costs 
downward and improve clinical quality.159 Some may prove successful, while others 
may not. Regardless, it is the responsibility of the federal government and the health 
care industry itself to pursue every opportunity to innovate and improve 
performance. Further, the federal government must respond to the call for change 
and permit industry participants to explore all methods of achieving success. 
Allowing the integration of certain health care providers focused on producing cost 
savings or efficiencies, enhancing quality and patient outcomes, and enhancing or 
maintaining existing health care service offerings is a significant opportunity to 
                                                           
 156 See GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 10. 
 157 See FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (holding 
that doubts related to anticompetitive effects are to be resolved against the transaction at 
issue). 
 158 See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Nos. 1:12-CV-
00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *25 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014) aff’d, 
778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). “In a world that was not governed by the Clayton Act, the best 
result might be to approve the Acquisition and monitor its outcome to see if the predicted 
price increases actually occurred. In other words, the Acquisition could serve as a controlled 
experiment.” Id. 
 159 See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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advance the ideals of meaningful health care reform. Antitrust enforcement in the 
health care sector should reflect those ideals. Thus, a statutory exemption to strict 
enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act should be considered a viable 
opportunity to promote and advance health system transformation for the better, as 
long as the merging providers satisfy the Proposed Exemption Criteria.160  
  
                                                           
 160 Health care provider transactions should be exempt from Section 7 enforcement as long 
as they meet the following criteria: (1) demonstrate likely cost savings or efficiencies, (2) 
focus on enhancing quality or patient outcomes, and (3) aim to enhance or maintain existing 
health care service offerings. 
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